

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 03676 01 OF 04 050938Z

15

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 IO-11 (ISO) W

----- 014586

O R 050924Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6941

USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 03676

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, GW, GE, WB, US, UK, FR, UR

SUBJECT: REICHSBAHN CONSTRUCTION IN WEST BERLIN

REFS: (A) USBERLIN 427; (B) USBERLIN 426;

(C) USBERLIN 418; (D) BONN 3592;

(E) USBERLIN 395

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE FRG PERMREP TO THE GDR, GAUS, WILL
MAKE A DEMARCHE IN EAST BERLIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO
EMPHASIZE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE FRG VIEWS THE
FAILURE OF THE REICHSBAHN TO COMPLY WITH ALLIED LEGIS-
LATION. THE BONN GROUP HAS AGREED THAT THE FOLLOW-UP
ALLIED APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS SHOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL
RESULTS OF THE GAUS DEMARCHE ARE KNOWN, AND THAT NO
FURTHER ENFORCEMENT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE AK
OR THE SENAT FOR THE TIME BEING.

THE BONN GROUP HAS ALSO DISCUSSED POSSIBILITIES FOR A
COMPROMISE, WITH THE UK REP SUGGESTING THAT IT MIGHT BE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 03676 01 OF 04 050938Z

POSSIBLE TO VIEW THE SENAT OR THE WEST BERLIN CONSTRUC-

TION FIRMS AS INTERMEDIARIES IN OBTAINING THE PER-MISSION WHICH ACCORDING TO BK/O (75)15 IS TO BE OBTAINED BY THE REICHSBAHN. THE FRG REP AGREED THAT SUCH AN INTERMEDIARY THEORY MIGHT PROVE THE ONLY POSSIBLE COMPROMISE, WHILE US AND FRENCH REPS EXPRESSED MIS-GIVINGS AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A COMPROMISE. CONSULTATIONS WILL BE CONTINUED AS SOON AS A REPORT OF THE GAUS MEETING IS AVAILABLE. END SUMMARY.

1. AT SPECIAL BONN GROUP MEETING AFTERNOON OF MARCH 4, FRG REP (LUECKING) REPORTED RESULTS OF TWO FRG INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MEETINGS THAT MORNING -- FIRST AT THE WORKING LEVEL AND THEN AT THE CHANCELLERY WITH STATE SECRETARY SCHUELER, GAUS, AND OTHERS. AT THE SECOND MEETING IT WAS DECIDED, SUBJECT TO ALLIED VIEWS, THAT GAUS SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE AN APPROACH IN EAST BERLIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE SOVIET REPLY TO THE ALLIES. IT COULD BE GUessed WHAT THE SOVIET REPLY WOULD BE, AND THERE MIGHT BE A CHANCE TO INFLUENCE IT BY LETTING THE GDR KNOW HOW SERIOUSLY THE FRG VIEWED THE SITUATION.

2. THE LINE TO BE TAKEN BY GAUS, LUECKING CONTINUED, WOULD BE THAT THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF IMPLEMENTING THE DECEMBER 19 TRAFFIC AGREEMENT. IN CONCLUDING THE AGREEMENT, IT HAD OF COURSE BEEN THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE FRG -- AND THE FRG HAD SEEN NO NEED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER -- THAT ALL ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WELL-ESTABLISHED LEGAL SITUATION IN BERLIN AND THE PROCEDURES USED IN THE PAST IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS.

3. LUECKING REQUESTED ALLIED VIEWS ON A GAUS APPROACH, WHICH MIGHT BE MADE AS EARLY AS FRIDAY MORNING, MARCH 5. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE BONN GROUP CONSIDER NEXT STEPS AND WORK OUT AN AGREED SCENARIO ON WHAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF GDR COMPLIANCE AND WHAT WOULD BE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

4. ALL THREE ALLIED REPS AGREED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 03676 01 OF 04 050938Z

A GAUS DEMARCHE TO THE GDR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ON THE PROPOSED LINE. THE BONN GROUP ALSO AGREED THAT THE ALLIES IN BERLIN SHOULD NOT MAKE A FOLLOW-UP APPROACH TO THE SOVIETS BEFORE THE RESULTS OF THE GAUS DEMARCHE WERE KNOWN AND, IN ADDITION, THAT FOR THE TIME BEING NO FURTHER ACTION AIMED AT ENFORCEMENT OF THE BK/O SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE AK OR THE SENAT, BARRING SUDDEN UNEXPECTED NEW DEVELOPMENTS. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT EVENTS

MIGHT MOVE QUICKLY ARGUED FOR CLOSE COORDINATION IN
BONN OF FUTURE ACTIONS.

5. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO A CONSIDERATION OF WHAT
THE ALLIES MIGHT CONSIDER THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE FOR
COMPLIANCE WITH BK/O (75)15, AND PARTICULARLY PARAGRAPH

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 03676 02 OF 04 050942Z

12
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 IO-11 (ISO) W
----- 009837

O R 050924Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6942
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 BONN 03676

4 (A), WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:

"ALL PLANS AND CONTRACTS RELATIVE TO THESE MEASURES
ARE TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE DEUTSCHE REICHSBAHN
TO THE COMPETENT ALLIED SECTOR AUTHORITIES FOR
PRIOR APPROVAL."

6. NOTING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, THE
UK REP (HITCH) EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE MINIMUM
WOULD BE TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE

BK/O HAD BEEN FULFILLED -- I.E., THAT THE AK HAD RECEIVED THE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR IT TO DETERMINE THAT THE SPECIAL STATUS OF THE REICHSBAHN HAD NOT BEEN AFFECTED. IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHERE THE INFORMATION CAME FROM; IT COULD BE PROVIDED TO THE AK BY THE SENAT OR BY THE WEST BERLIN FIRMS HIRED BY THE REICHSBAHN TO PERFORM THE WORK. THE AK -- WHICH AS A MATTER OF LAW IS THE ONE TO DETERMINE WHAT ITS OWN LEGISLATION MEANS --

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 03676 02 OF 04 050942Z

COULD CONSIDER THAT THE INFORMATION HAD BEEN PROVIDED ON BEHALF OF THE REICHSBAHN, AND IT WOULD ISSUE FORMAL AUTHORIZATION TO THE REICHSBAHN TO PROCEED WITH THE WORK. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE NECESSARY FOR THE REICHSBAHN TO ACCEPT SUCH AUTHORIZATION WITHOUT CONTESTING IT.

7. A SECOND PART OF THE UK PROPOSAL WOULD BE THAT THE AK, IN ORDER TO RESTORE LOST FACE, SHOULD SUSPEND WORK FOR A PERIOD -- PERHAPS A DAY -- WHILE IT WAS REVIEWING THE DOCUMENTS AND ISSUING APPROVAL. THAT STEP WOULD NOT BE TAKEN HOWEVER, UNTIL THE AK WAS CERTAIN IT WAS RECEIVING THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS.

8. US REP EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE UK PROPOSAL REPRESENTED LESS THAN THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE, IN THAT IT WOULD AMOUNT TO AGREEING THAT THE REICHSBAHN COULD GET AWAY WITHOUT COMPLYING AT ALL WITH THE BK/O. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS NOT TECHNICAL DATA BUT A SHOWING THAT, CONTRARY TO WHAT THE GDR WAS SAYING, THE DECEMBER 19 AGREEMENT WAS NOT A GDR-SENAT AGREEMENT AND DID NOT GIVE THE GDR THE RIGHT TO PERFORM WORK IN WEST BERLIN WITHOUT ALLIED ASSENT. FRENCH REP (BOISSIEU) EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THE US VIEW.

9. ASKED FOR ELABORATION ON THE INTERNAL GERMAN DISCUSSIONS, LUECKING SAID THEY HAD REACHED EXACTLY THE SAME CONCLUSIONS AS THE UK. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET THE GDR TO PRESENT AN APPLICATION TO THE AK AS IT HAD DONE IN THE PAST, AND THE FRG DID NOT SEE HOW IT COULD BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE GDR TO GET IT TO COMPLY WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. THE ONLY COMPROMISE THE FRG HAD BEEN ABLE TO THINK OF WAS AN INTERMEDIARY THEORY SUCH AS THE ONE THE UK HAD PROPOSED. IT HAD REACHED NO FIRM CONCLUSION AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CONSIDER THE SENAT OR THE CONTRACTING FIRMS AS THE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE REICHSBAHN AND THE AK, REALIZING THAT THERE WERE PROS AND CONS FOR EACH. LUECKING ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE GDR THAT THIS WAS THE MINIMUM COMPROMISE AND THAT

THE PLAN WOULD NOT WORK AT ALL IF THE GDR DISPUTED THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 03676 02 OF 04 050942Z

INTERMEDIARY THEORY.

10. MEICHESNER (BERLIN REPRESENTATION) ASKED WHETHER THE US REP WOULD CONSIDER IT TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO USE THE INTERMEDIARY THEORY EVEN IF THE REICHSBAHN WERE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO REQUEST THE SENAT TO TRANSMIT THE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO THE AK. US REP RESPONDED THAT HE WAS, OF COURSE, NOT RULING OUT THE ULTIMATE NECESSITY FOR FALLING BACK ON AN INTERMEDIARY PLAN AND THAT AN ACTIVE REICHSBAHN ROLE SUCH AS MEICHESNER SUGGESTED MIGHT MAKE IT MORE PALATABLE. HE EXPRESSED SOME PERSONAL SKEPTICISM, HOWEVER, THAT THE GDR WOULD PERMIT SUCH A REQUEST TO BE MADE IN THE NAME OF THE REICHSBAHN, GIVEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTRY AS EXPRESSED ON FEBRUARY 27 TO A SENAT OFFICIAL (PARA 4, REF E).

11. AFTER PROLONGED DISCUSSION
BOISSIEU, AS CHAIRMAN, SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY MORE ACTION VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS UNTIL THE REPORT OF THE GAUS DEMARCHE WAS AVAILABLE.

B. NO MORE ENFORCEMENT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 03676 03 OF 04 050948Z

12
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 ACDA-05 SAJ-01 IO-11 (ISO) W

----- 009852

O R 050924Z MAR 76
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6943
USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 BONN 03676

BERLIN FOR THE TIME BEING.

C. IF THE RESPONSE FROM THE GDR AND THE SOVIETS
WERE EITHER POSITIVE OR TOTALLY NEGATIVE, THE ANSWER
WOULD BE OBVIOUS. IN THE LATTER CASE, THE ALLIES WOULD
PRESUMABLY BE FORCED TO TAKE ACTION TO ENFORCE THE BK/O.

D. THE MORE LIKELY RESPONSE WOULD BE AMBIGUOUS,
IN WHICH CASE A COMPROMISE SHOULD BE SOUGHT AND PRAG-
MATIC SOLUTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE
TO BUILD A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE AROUND THE REQUEST
OF THE GDR FOR THE SENAT TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL LAND,
ALTHOUGH THIS IDEA WAS NOT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AND
NONE OF THE BONN GROUP REPS HAD ANY CLEAR NOTION OF
WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN THE LAND REQUEST OR HOW IT MIGHT
BE USED.

E. THE ONLY OTHER COMPROMISE WHICH CAME TO MIND
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 03676 03 OF 04 050948Z

WAS THE UK EMBASSY PROPOSAL, SUPPORTED BY THE FRG,
THAT THE ALLIES ACCEPT AN INTERMEDIARY FOR TRANSMITTING
DOCUMENTS BETWEEN THE REICHSBAHN AND THE AK. QUES-
TIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED UNDER THIS
SCENARIO WOULD INCLUDE:

- WHETHER THE SENAT OR THE CONTRACTING FIRMS
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE INTERMEDIARY;
- WHAT MINIMUM ROLE WOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE
REICHSBAHN (COULD IT REMAIN TOTALLY PASSIVE,
OR WOULD AN ACTIVE REQUEST ON ITS PART BE
REQUIRED?);

-- WHAT FORM WOULD BE USED FOR TRANSMITTING
THE DOCUMENTS; AND
-- WHAT ACTION THE AK SHOULD TAKE, ONCE IT
RECEIVED THE NECESSARY DATA, TO SHOW THAT IT
WAS MAINTAINING ITS RIGHTS (I.E., SHOULD
THERE BE A TEMPORARY WORK STOPPAGE?).

F. BOTH THE US AND THE FRENCH REPS MAINTAINED
RESERVATIONS ON THIS LATTER COMPROMISE SOLUTION AND
WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. HITCH INTERJECTED THAT HE
WOULD ALSO HAVE TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE AGREEING TO
THE COMPROMISE HE HAD SUGGESTED.

12. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE BONN GROUP WOULD RECONVENE
AS SOON AS THE FRG COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE GAUS
DEMARCHE.

13. COMMENT: A DECISION ON THE COURSE OF ACTION TO
BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIES WILL, OF COURSE, NEED TO AWAIT
THE GAUS DEMARCHE AND FURTHER SOUNDINGS WITH THE SOVIETS.
THE POSSIBILITIES, HOWEVER, SEEM TO BE SHAPING UP RATHER
CLEARLY: (A) CLEAR GDR COMPLIANCE WITH THE BK/O
(THOUGHT TO BE UNLIKELY); (B) CLEAR AND OPEN GDR DEFIANCE
OF BK/O (WHICH WOULD LEAVE ALLIES NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE
STEPS AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN WEST BERLIN);
OR (C) SOMETHING LESS THAN CLEAR-CUT, PUBLIC DEFIANCE
BY THE GDR OF THE ALLIED LEGISLATION. IN THIS LATTER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 03676 03 OF 04 050948Z

CASE, THE ALLIES WOULD NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER TO INSIST
ON ABSOLUTE COMPLIANCE WITH BK/O (75) 15 OR TO BACK DOWN
TO THE EXTENT OF AGREEING WITH SOME KIND OF
"COMPROMISE" SUCH AS THE INTERMEDIARY THEORY ADVANCED
BY THE UK REP.

14. IN CASE OF AN INDICATION BY THE OTHER SIDE THAT
SOME KIND OF "COMPROMISE" IS POSSIBLE, THE PROBLEMS WITH
ALLIED INSISTENCE ON GDR COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ARE
IMMEDIATE AND VISIBLE. THE CHANCELLOR DEMONSTRATED IN
DECEMBER THAT HE HAD LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE
COMPLEXITIES OF THE BERLIN SITUATION AND LITTLE
PATIENCE WITH WHAT HE VIEWS AS MERE LEGALISMS ADVANCED
IN THE NAME OF PRESERVING THE ALLIED POSITION IN
BERLIN. THE TRANSIT AGREEMENT WAS OF CONSIDERABLE
IMPORTANCE TO HIM, AND HE WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT WELCOME
ACTION ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES WHICH MIGHT HINDER FUL-
FILLMENT OF THE AGREEMENT. THE OPPOSITION WOULD DERIVE
CONSIDERABLE MILEAGE OUT OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

15. HOWEVER, TO ACCEPT THE INTERMEDIARY THEORY OR ANY OTHER "COMPROMISE" WHICH WOULD REVEAL THAT THE GDR DID NOT HAVE TO OBEY THE LAW IN WEST BERLIN WOULD INVOLVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL DANGER FOR THE LONG RUN. IT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 03676 04 OF 04 050944Z

15

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 SAJ-01 ACDA-05 IO-11 (ISO) W

----- 009850

O R 050924Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6944

USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 BONN 03676

WOULD GIVE CONFIRMATION TO THE IDEA, WHICH THE GDR IS REPEATING WITH DISTURBING REGULARITY, THAT THE DECEMBER 19 AGREEMENT WAS ONE CONCLUDED BY THE GDR AND THE SENAT, AND THUS TEND TO VALIDATE GDR VIEWS ON WEST BERLIN AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY. MOREOVER, IT WOULD ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR THE GDR'S TAKING ACTION DIRECTLY IN WEST BERLIN WITHOUT BENEFIT OF AK APPROVAL. THE FACT THAT THE REICHSBAHN IS CONTINUING TO COMPLY WITH NORMAL PROCEDURES IN OTHER MATTERS AFFECTING REICHSBAHN PROPERTY IN WEST BERLIN (REF C), HEIGHTENS OUR FEARS THAT GDR REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH BK/O (75) 15, WHICH WAS A RESTATEMENT OF THOSE LONG-

STANDING NORMAL PROCEDURES, IS DESIGNED TO USE THE DECEMBER 19 AGREEMENT FOR ADVANCING THESE POSITIONS.

16. THERE IS ANOTHER FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATION. WHAT THE GDR IS AIMING AT IS NOTHING LESS THAN A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE QA: IF THE EAST GERMANS SUCCEED WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 03676 04 OF 04 050944Z

THEIR INTENT THEY WILL HAVE UNILATERALLY (WITH SOVIET HELP) CHANGED THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN BERLIN. WE BELIEVE THIS BASIC POINT SHOULD NOT BE LOST SIGHT OF AMONG ALL THE SEEMINGLY PETTY AND UNIMPORTANT DISCUSSION OF REICHSEBAHN CONSTRUCTION.

17. WE WILL PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION ONCE FULLER INFORMATION ON THE GDR AND SOVIET POSITION IS AVAILABLE. INTERIM GUIDANCE WOULD BE WELCOME.

HILLENBRAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, CONSTRUCTION, NEGOTIATIONS, HIGHWAYS, BERLIN HIGHWAY ACCESS, REICHSBAHN
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976BONN03676
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P760043-1813
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760392/aaaaddak.tel
Line Count: 462
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 76 USBERLIN 427, 76 USBERLIN 426
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 MAR 2004 by MartinML>; APPROVED <04 AUG 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: REICHSBAHN CONSTRUCTION IN WEST BERLIN
TAGS: PFOR, PGOV, GE, GC, WB, US, UK, FR, UR
To: STATE USBERLIN
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006